Although Associated Press has claimed while citing intercepted radio communications between Taliban militants that Hakeemullah Mehsud had died in the January 12, 2012 US drone attacks in North Waziristan, the TTP circles have strongly refuted the report, saying he was not in the area where the drone strike occurred. Five people were killed and three others injured in the January 12, 2012 drone attack on two vehicles in the Dattakhel area of North Waziristan and Hakeemullah Mehsud is believed to amongst those killed in the strike. This was the second drone attack by the CIA-operated spy planes in the North Waziristan area as the American predators resumed their strikes on January 10, 2012 after a pause of almost six weeks.

The tribal sources have claimed that the drone fired two missiles and hit a double cabin pick-up vehicle and a car near the Dogga village in Dattakhel Tehsil, 45 kilometres west of Miramshah, the headquarters of the North Waziristan tribal agency. According to villagers in Dattakhel, some people were sitting in their vehicles after performing their Maghrib prayers when they came under drone attack. The double cabin pick-up vehicle caught fire and four men were killed on the spot. Their badly mutilated bodies were pulled out of the destroyed vehicle later. Another person was killed in another vehicle – a car – that was targeted by a drone. His body was mutilated and beyond recognition. There was no way to ascertain the identity of the slain men. However, it is now believed that one of those killed was Hakeemullah.

As a matter of fact, it was exactly a year ago that the international media had reported Hakeemullah’s death in North Waziristan in a January 14, 2011 US drone attack, saying the missiles struck a compound in the Shaktoi area, where the fugitive TTP ameer was asleep. It was claimed that Hakeemullah died along with 18 other militants. Although TTP spokesman Azam Tariq denied that the TTP ameer had died, he did confirm that Hakeemullah had been in the area. On January 16, 2011, the TTP released an audiotape carrying the voice of Hakeemullah, who said, “Today, on the 16th of January 2011, I am saying it again – I am alive, I am ok, I am not injured … when the drone strike took place, I was not present in the area at that time.”

However, subsequent rumours claimed that he had died of injuries received in the attack. On January 31, 2011, Pakistan state television PTV reported that Hakeemullah Mehsud was injured in the drone attack and died three days later. He was allegedly buried in Orakzai Agency. Reuters, quoting Pakistani intelligence sources suggested that while escaping the initial attack, he was killed in another attack on January 17, 2011. As the TTP rejected these reports, The New York Times claimed that the American intelligence was 90% sure that Hakeemullah was dead. On February 9, 2010, media reports, citing TTP sources, stated that Mehsud had indeed been fatally wounded on January 14, 2010 and died en route to Karachi for medical treatment.

Interior Minister Rehman Malik and some unnamed Pakistani intelligence officials had confirmed to the Associated Press that the militant leader had perished but provided no further details. While the Taliban did release a videotape of Mehsud on February 28, 2010, officials questioned when the tape was made, as Mehsud did not provide details on current events. On April 28, 2010, Pakistani intelligence sources expressed doubts of Mehsud’s demise. They believed that Mehsud had been seriously injured in the strike and that his authority in the TTP had been overshadowed by other figures. On May 3, a video of Hakeemullah surfaced that was recorded in April 2010. But Hakeemullah was finally seen in the February 28, 2011 execution video of a former ISI official Colonel Sultan Ameer Tarar, better known as Colonel Imam.

Whether or not Hakeemullah was killed in the January 12, 2012 US drone strike, the fact remains that he is the prime target of the American predators, especially after having been held responsible [on September 2, 2010] for a 2009 suicide attack on a CIA base in Afghanistan which killed six senior CIA officials. To recall, Hakeemullah had appeared alongside suicide bomber Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi in an early January 2010 video that claimed responsibility for the suicide attack on the CIA office in Afghanistan in retaliation for the death of Baitulluh Mehsud.

The seven-minute-long video, which is titled ‘Cubs of Waziristan,’ has been released on jihadi websites by the Al Ansar Mailing List. An edited version of the video and the translation has been provided by the SITE Intelligence Group. The location of the training camp seems to be the Mirali area of North Waziristan, which serves as a haven for the fugitive al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Coming back to the seven-minute-long video, titled ‘Cubs of Waziristan,’ it shows a group of 16 teenage jihadis, including six trainers armed with assault rifles and ten young recruits who are standing in a half circle. An older fighter, who seems to be their trainer or leader, is shown citing a verse from the Holy Quran that says Muslims must prepare for war against ‘the enemy of Allah and your enemy’.

“In obedience of this divine command, we are preparing militarily and Shariah and faith-wise,” the fighter is shown as saying. “In this way, we are erasing ages of humiliation that we tasted and in which we grew up. At times we were scared of match sticks, and now, thanks to Allah, here are the children of the Muslims getting trained in weapons that US Special Forces are trained to use. This is an embodiment of the extirpation of the defeatist moral that was planted in the Islamic Ummah [community].

“The young Pakistani children are then seen undergoing firearms training with pistols, assault rifles, and machine guns. The boys are conducting shooting drills in lanes, with paper targets tacked up on posts. A few of the smaller kids are seen having difficulty handling the recoil of the assault rifles. The video ends with the trainers and the young recruits, who are now armed with assault rifles, standing in line, raising their weapons, and shouting “Allah Almighty is Great”.

Located between eastern Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan, the North Waziristan Agency also provides shelter to many anti-American terrorist organisations such as the Haqqani Network, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the Islamic Jihad Union, the Islamic Army of Great Britain, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the Harkatul Jehadul Islami, the Jamaat-ul-Furqaan, the Fidayeen-e-Islami, as well as the splinter groups of the Harkatul Mujahideen (HuM), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), among others.

Many of the terrorist attacks targeting the American and Western installations and individuals in Pakistan as well as the headquarters of the Pakistani security and intelligence interests, had been jointly planned by al-Qaeda and the TTP in North Waziristan. At the same time, much of al-Qaeda’s most wanted core leadership remains in the Mirali, Miramshah and Datta Khel areas of North Waziristan and continues to mastermind bloody acts of terrorism on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border. The US considers the Haqqani Network and its role in the insurgency in Afghanistan among the most difficult challenges the ISAF faces, but has so far simply failed to convince the Pakistani military establishment to take action against the Haqqani Network’s safe havens on the Pakistani soil. The Americans maintain that the North Waziristan has become a hub of the anti-US elements given the fact that it has a common border with Khost, the native Afghan province of Jalaluddin Haqqani.

However, the Pakistani military authorities, despite intense US pressure, have so far shown reluctance to carry out a full-fledged military operation in North Waziristan. They have been insisting that military operations against the militants would be undertaken at the timing of its own choosing and at a scale in keeping with its strength of manpower and military hardware. On the other hand, the American drones have targeted the North Waziristan extensively since the dawn of 2010, especially after a suicide bomber killed seven CIA officers in the Khost area of Afghanistan on December 31, 2009 by exploding himself inside the CIA facility.

PESHAWAR (Pakistan): For people who openly sell night-vision goggles, grenades and even the occasional RPG, the dealers at the American Market in Peshawar are remarkably reluctant to talk about their clientele. Eventually, a laptop dealer, selling Dells and HPs at knockdown prices, explains who the dealers here sell their weapons to. “Most of the arms here will end up with the Taliban. Some people come to buy these weapons for themselves but mostly they are bought by militants,“ he says. He explains that the area has come to be known as the American Market because it sells US goods that have either been stolen and transported from Afghanistan or captured from Nato trucks being transported from Pakistan to Afghanistan. While everything from scanned goods to electronic equipment is available at the American Market, the majority of the items on sale are weapons. The laptop dealer says the American Market is only the third largest of its kind in Pakistan, and similar markets in Bara, Jamrud and Dara Adam Khel offer a greater variety of weapons, although he adds that there has been an army clampdown in Dara Adam Khel. Despite the abundance of arms available in these markets, this is only the tip of the iceberg for the Taliban. “The Taliban are the United Nations of weaponry,“ says Lee Wollonsky, an arms-smuggling expert who has worked with various think-tanks in the US. “They have arms from the US, China, Russia, Iran and just about every other country you can think of.” How the Taliban became an essential chain in the global arms trade, is a fascinating story. Wollonsky says that the Taliban linked into arms smuggling networks that originated from Russia. “You have dealers in Russia with their own private chartered airlines that they use to smuggle arms around the world. The Taliban get arms from charter airlines that are registered in the UAE, where there is very little oversight.” According to Wollonsky, there airlines shuttle poisonous chemicals, arms, ammunition and sometimes even operatives to Taliban operatives in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The planes that are used are usually the discarded ones from the days of the Soviet Union. Another source of Taliban arms in Pakistan, says Shanaka Jayasekara, is the LTTE in Sri Lanka. Jayasekara has done academic research into the Tamil separatist group and believes that the LTTE had front groups in Sharjah that smuggled weapons into Karachi, from where they would be distributed to the Taliban. The US, meanwhile, believes that the Taliban may be getting weaponry from Iran. Militant safe houses raided in the tribal areas have revealed the presence of Iranian-made AK-47s but it is not known if these have been smuggled out of Iran or provided by the government of Iran. Taliban videos posted on jihadi-websites, meanwhile, show them carrying Chinese anti-aircraft missiles which, most arms-control experts believe, have come through the international smuggling network and not from the Chinese government. Ultimately, though, the greatest provider – though inadvertently – of weaponry to the Taliban based in Afghanistan may be its greatest target: the US. As the laptop dealer at the American Market in Peshawar says, “The US gives weapons to people in Afghanistan to fight the Taliban and they just go and sell it to people here who then sell it to the Taliban.”

While 58 terrorism-related incidents have jolted Peshawar (Charsadda and Darra Adamkhel included) since September 11, 2001, the twin cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad have been hit 46 times by terrorists in these last eight and a half years.

A research conducted by The News, using statistics and chronology recorded by the US Department of State, archives of Pakistani newspapers and websites carrying

information about global terrorism, has revealed that while the port city of Karachi has been struck 37 times by terrorists during this period under review, Lahore has confronted such happenings on 21 occasions, the same number as the Swat valley.

While Quetta has so far seen blood pouring down its drains 18 times, Dera Ismail Khan has been attacked 16 times by the terrorists during this still ongoing war. The Pakistan Army personnel and installations of country’s armed forces, outside the war zones of Swat, South and North Waziristan etc, have been targeted at least 22 times during this time period under review.

Meanwhile, not fewer than 105 terrorism incidents have taken place since in the war-ridden Bajaur Agency, Kurram Agency, Orakzai Agency, Lower and Upper Dir, Mohmand Agency, South Waziristan and North Waziristan agencies etc.

The NWFP cities mainly hit include Hangu, Kohat, Shangla, Buner, Bannu, Mansehra, Buner, Haripur, Nowshehra, Lakki Marwat and Parachanar etc. Terror has also whacked the calm of Dera Bugti four times.

The residents of Bahawalpur, Sialkot, Hub, Sargodha and Faisalabad found themselves strapped in the grip of fear on two occasions each.

Horror also haunted Multan, Mian Channu, Taxilla, Pishin, Panjgur, Gujranwala, Wah, Dera Ghazi Khan, Kalat, Kamra, Bhakkar, Chakwal, Mianwali, Hassan Abdal and Muzaffarabad etc, at least once each.

During this fright-studded period, high-ranking al-Qaeda officials like Abu Zubaida and Ramzi Binalshibh were arrested by Pakistani officials on March 23, 2002, and September 14, 2002, respectively.

Similarly, on March 1, 2003, Wall Street Journal newsman Daniel Pearl’s killer Khalid Shaikh Muhammed was arrested during CIA-led raids on a suburb of Rawalpindi.

At the time of his capture, Khalid was the third highest ranking official in al-Qaeda and was believed to have supervised the planning for the September 11 attacks on the US.

Khalid Sheikh Muhammed was also linked the USS Cole bombing, an attempt to blow up a civilian airliner with a shoe bomb and the terrorist attack at a synagogue in Tunisia.

Claiming that it has lost around $35 billion since joining the still-continuing War on Terror, Pakistan witnessed only two terror-related incidents in 2001, 14 in 2002, just 8 in 2003, 18 in 2004, 11 in 2005, 16 in 2006, 56 in 2007, 72 in 2008, 130 in 2009 and 29 in the first two-and-a-half months of 2010 till the fling of this report.

The year 2009 of course remained the bloodiest of all with 130 incidents claiming around 1,800 lives, followed by 2008 which saw 1,565 people falling prey to 72 such attacks.

Terror in Pakistan claimed the lives of eminent personalities like the two-time Premier Benazir Bhutto (December 27, 2007), banned Anjuman-e-Sipah-e-Sihaba chief Maulana Azam Tariq (October 6, 2003), former Interior Minister Lt Gen (R) Moinuddin Haider’s elder brother Ehteshamuddin Haider (December 21, 2000), noted religious scholar Ghulam Murtaza Malik (May 7, 2002), eminent Deobandi scholar and head of Islamic religious school Jamia Binoria, Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai (May 30, 2004), leading Shia scholar and Chief of Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan, Allama Hassan Turabi (July 14, 2006), Chief of Peshawar City Police Malik Saad (January 27, 2007), former Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam MNA and Wafaqul Madaris Vice Chairman Maulana Hassan Jan (September 15, 2007), Pakistan Army’s top medic Lt Gen Mushtaq Baig (February 25, 2008), former head of Pakistan Army’s Special Services Group Maj Gen (R) Ameer Faisal Alvi (November 19, 2008), Awami National Party Provincial law-maker Alam Zeb Khan (February 11, 2009), leading Sunni Barelwi cleric Sarfraz Ahmed Naeemi (June 12, 2009), Punjab-born Balochistan Education Minister Shafiq Ahmed Khan (October 25, 2009), Balochistan’s Deputy Inspector General Nizam Shahid Durrani (November 19, 2009), ANP politician Shamsher Ali Khan (December 1, 2009), former NWFP Education Minister Ghani-ur-Rehman (January 3, 2010), Peshawar’s District Police Officer Iqbal Marwat (February 12, 2010) and Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnat’s key leaders Mufti Saeed Jalalpuri (March 11, 2010) and Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Nadeem (March 14, 2010).

During this particular period, former President Pervez Musharraf survived three life attempts.

While Musharraf saw death close to him twice in December 2003, he also managed to survive the July 6, 2006, attack aimed at his life.

Then Corps Commander Karachi Lt Gen Ahsan Saleem Hayat also narrowly escaped on June 10, 2004, when gunmen opened fire at his convoy in Karachi.

On July 30, 2004, there was an unsuccessful assassination attempt on the Prime Minister-elect Shaukat Aziz, while he was campaigning for a by-election in Attock District.

On August 2, 2004, Balochistan Chief Minister Jam Mohammad Yousaf also managed to deceive death.

On April 28, 2006, the then Interior Minister Aftab Ahmad Sherpao, survived an assassination bid at Charsadda.

On July 17, 2007, another suicide bomber blew himself up outside the venue of the district bar council convention in Islamabad, just be-fore the arrival of Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry.

Former prime minister Benazir Bhutto also escaped unhurt on October 18, 2007, when her convoy was attacked in Karachi upon her return from a long exile, but could not ride her luck the second time she was fatally targeted on December 27, 2007.

On October 30, 2007, a suicide bomber struck a police checkpoint in the high security zone of Rawalpindi, less than a kilometre from President Musharraf’s Camp Office.

The blast also splattered the checkpost outside the residence of then Chief of the General Staff General Tariq Majid.

On November 9, 2007, a suicide bomber detonated explosives at the house of the then Federal Political Affairs Minister Amir Muqam in Peshawar. The minister escaped unhurt though.

On December 21, 2007, a suicide bomber again unsuccessfully targeted former Interior Minister Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao.

On June 9, 2008, controversial Swat cleric and chief of Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat Muhammadi Maulana Sufi Muhammad survived a remote-controlled bomb.

On October 2, 2008, a suicide attacker targeted the Charsadda house of ANP leader Asfandyar Wali Khan, who survived the attack.

On October 6, 2008, a suicide attacker targeted a gathering at PML-N legislator Rashid Akbar Nawani’s house in Bhakkar. Nawani luckily survived the attack.

On November 11, 2008, a suicide bomber blew himself up at a packed Qayyum Stadium in Peshawar, minutes after the NWFP Governor Owais Ghani had left the venue and just moments prior to the departure of Senior Provincial Minister Bashir Bilour.

On March 3, 2009, a convoy carrying Sri Lankan cricketers and officials in two buses was fired upon near the Gaddafi Stadium in Lahore. Six members of the Sri Lankan cricket team were injured.

On March 11, 2009, senior minister of the NWFP Bashir Bilour survived yet another assassination attempt in Peshawar.

On June 11, 2009, the NWFP Prisons Minister, Mian Nisar Gul Kakakhel, was

seriously injured when his convoy was ambushed by suspected militants in Darra Adam Khel.

On September 2, 2009, sitting Religious Affairs Minister Hamid Saeed Kazmi was injured in a brazen attack in Islamabad.

On February 9, 2010, renowned politician Sheikh Rashid Ahmed was attacked by militants in Rawalpindi, though Sheikh Rashid managed to live on by ducking the bullets.

The intellectual cowardice of some should not blind the majority to the fact that the war in Afghanistan is morally indefensible and militarily unwinnable.

The decision of the US to continue with its brutal military adventurism in Afghanistan can only be understood in terms of its limited and highly selfish political logic.

Let us start by ruling out some of the ridiculous assumptions that have permeated this war since it began in 2001. First, we were told that the war was aimed at eliminating al-Qaida. However, a retied CIA Station Chief who has served in the Middle East and as Chief of the Counterterrorism Staff, has claimed that, “al-Qaida is finished in Afghanistan.” He further argued that, “the Obama administration, like its predecessor, claims we are fighting terrorism there. That is simply not true. It is a pure counterinsurgency issue.”

Indeed, even the most ardent war hawks are exerting little effort to delineate the link between Taliban and al-Qaida. If the link is infused, it is readily unleashed to demonstrate al-Qaida’s links to Pakistan’s tribal areas, thus urging ‘action’ in that part of the country, and not in Afghanistan.

Thanks to the random military ‘strategy’ of the US and its allies, al-Qaida has spread in all sorts of directions and branched off to many al-Qaida offshoots in various parts of the world. Without a centralized leadership in the military sense, al-Qaida inspired groups and individuals now are now working for localized sets of objectives and respond to different stimuli.

So if it’s not al-Qaida that is inspiring the awesome, although largely futile firepower and military surges in Afghanistan, then what is? This is where the idealists come in. They talk of nation-building, Western-style democracy, regional security and so on. Some of them genuinely mean what they say, and some don’t believe the present military surges and Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s rural area fight to the death will yield its intended results. Still, they contribute to the illusion that good intentions – starting with the initial hype about saving Afghani women, then ‘liberation’ from foreign terrorists, then democracy and nation-building, and so on – had anything to do with this bloody war. With their insistence on using such positive terminology, they continue to provide Washington’s political elites – and Kabul’s as well – with the benefit of the doubt that while we may disagree with their methods, we still trust their overall intentions.

It behooves those democracy-inspired, nation-building enthusiasts to remember that Washington has done much to stifle genuine democracy movements around the world since its occupation of Afghanistan in 2001. Palestine and Lebanon remain the most obvious examples. As for nation-building, compare the astronomical amounts invested in financing the destructive war in Afghanistan and to prop up the corrupt puppet regime in Kabul, to the miniscule sums devoted to enhancing the country’s stone-aged economic infrastructure. The US military budget for this year is set to exceed $693 billion, not counting the $42 billion set aside for Homeland Security. According to CostofWar.com, the financial cost of war in Afghanistan alone has exceeded the $256 billion; both wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are approaching the $1 trillion threshold.

The war in Afghanistan cannot possibly be defended on any moral grounds. The official death count of Afghani civilians in 2009 is estimated at 2,412. The actual death toll is probably far, far higher, as polls do not account for the many more who perished in distance villages across the south and east, areas that are not accessible to outsiders. The death of these innocent people alone should silence the few who still speak of ethics and morality in relation to the disastrous war.

But not everyone is so overtly misguided in their assessment of the war. Some fully understand that the war in Afghanistan is a self-seeking, political and strategic venture. Still, they giddily welcome it, including one Con Coughlin whose recent article in The Telegraph was tellingly entitled, ‘India and Pakistan must bury the hatchet for the Taliban to be crushed.’

The India-Pakistan rapprochement is seen as beneficial only insofar as its potential to ‘crush’ someone else. And considering that that someone else is not a band of aimless terrorists, but a well-grounded, grass-roots, popular insurgency, the price of that “crushing” is likely to be tens of thousands of innocent people. Coughlin uses the same haughty and generalized language of “militant Islamist groups” to be crushed, failing to understand or appreciate the distinctiveness of each and every situation, whether in Afghanistan, Pakistan or anywhere else. Instead, Coughlin nonchalantly expresses concern about the danger these militants pose to “the survival of the ruling classes” in Islamabad. What a compelling reason to get Richard Holbrooke, Washington’s special envoy to the region all fired up over the need to preserve the survival of the ruling classes, not just in Islamabad, but in Kabul and Delhi as well.

The war in Afghanistan has turned into find-an-objective-as-you-go military march to nowhere. It is proving futile and indefensible on every ground, be it political or military or moral. Moreover, as Haviland Smith concluded in his grim assessment, “it doesn’t really matter that we think of ourselves as benevolent liberators, it only matters that Afghans think of us as foreigners occupiers.” When will we all face up to this reality?

- Ramzy Baroud (www.ramzybaroud.net) is an internationally-syndicated columnist and the editor of PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is “My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza’s Untold Story” (Pluto Press, London), now available on Amazon.com.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Good evening viewers. I’m Mariam Chaudhry, and I’m bringing you a special interview set against the backdrop of Pak-U.S. relations. Our guest today is visiting U.S. Defense Secretary, Mr. Robert Gates.

Now, Mr. Robert Gates is one of those individuals who was selected at his post with bipartisan consensus — which is a rare occurrence — and in an even rarer instance, he was asked to stay on his job after the administration changed. Now, that’s a testament to his experience and his expertise at his job.

So, Mr. Gates, pleasure to have you in Pakistan.

SEC. GATES: Thank you.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Well, it’s an opportunity to have you here because we’d like to start by some questions on Afghanistan. Firstly, I would like to ask you, how do you see the development shaping up on the Afghan horizon, with the troop surge on one hand and then you also have some very bold attacks coming from the Taliban this month as a sort of retaliation?

SEC. GATES: Well, there was never any question in our minds that as the fight got tougher, that the Taliban would react. They are adaptive, they’re clever, and these kinds of spectacular suicide attempts that we’ve seen are tragic, but not unanticipated. And as we have warned, as we take the fight to the Taliban, our own casualties are likely to increase as well.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Do you think their response is coming very quickly though?

SEC. GATES: No, they have known for quite some time, after all the president put an additional 20-some-thousand troops into Afghanistan last year, they’ve been there since last July. So the notion that increased U.S. forces and allied forces, I would say, were coming has not exactly been a surprise.

MS. CHAUDHRY: So how would you describe it? What is your assessment of the Taliban capabilities at this juncture?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think they are a very tough adversary. I think General McChrystal would characterize the situation as serious. By the same token, we are convinced that we have an outstanding strategy on the part of the president, that General McChrystal has an outstanding campaign plan, and that we have the right leader and the right troops soon to be in place to be successful in this conflict.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Okay. Now while we speak of Afghanistan, I’m going to quote you. You said recently that reconciliation has to be a part of the ultimate conclusion here, just as it was in Iraq. And our question is, while we speak of reconciliation in Afghanistan, Pakistan has been insisting for a long time that the Pashtun population should be given adequate political representation in any Afghan set up. And that’s been a consistent demand, but 10 years down the line we don’t really see the Pashtun population being given a valid political space in the Afghan set up. What do you say about that?

SEC. GATES: Well, I would say, first of all, that the president of Afghanistan is Pashtun.

MS. CHAUDHRY: I knew you would say that. (Laughter.) But that doesn’t make up for it, does it?

SEC. GATES: And in fact, there are a number of Pashtuns in the government.

MS. CHAUDHRY: It’s not really representative of the entire population, though.

SEC. GATES: No, it’s hard for one person to be representative, but he is the elected president, so he is as representative as anybody in the country, let’s put it that way.

But reconciliation and reintegration are really two different things. Reintegration is really focused at the lower-level Taliban, many of whom fight for money or to protect their families. And if we can offer them a job, if we can offer security for their families, we believe that a number of these fighters can be reintegrated.

Reconciliation tends to apply to the senior-most members of the Taliban. I think that for some of them to consider reconciliation on Afghan government terms, they will have to see that the momentum of the conflict has changed against them.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Well, I’ll ask about the Pashtun population, not just the Taliban leadership or the lower-grade workers or the inductees, because Pakistan feels that unless the Pashtuns are given adequate political representation, the Pashtun belt on both sides of the border is going to mean an upheaval. So, what moves should be made on that front?

SEC. GATES: I don’t think that you can have stability in Afghanistan long term unless all of the elements of the Pakistani population feel fairly represented, and that includes the Pashtun.

MS. CHAUDHRY: All right. Now, we know that fresh efforts have been made by the United States to consult Pakistan more on the war on terror and also to cement the relationship which already exists between Pakistan and the United States, and mostly these gestures are being viewed to be genuine.

But at the same time, there’s a lot of puzzlement in Pakistani quarters at the encouragement that the United States is giving to India on its role in Afghanistan. And there’s a lot of discomfort on the Pakistani side because they don’t feel very comfortable with a country with which they have had a very hostile relationship to be given such a strong stake in Afghanistan.

SEC. GATES: What I have welcomed and what most nations welcome is the economic and development assistance that India has provided to Afghanistan. I think what’s important is that over the long term both India and Pakistan have a strong relationship with Afghanistan.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Well, why is it important for India also to have such a strong stake in Afghanistan, because it’s Pakistan that shares a border with Afghanistan? Now clearly, the Pakistani state doesn’t share the conviction that India is going to be neutral in Afghanistan, and history tells us that India in fact has not been neutral, it’s been supporting certain cliques and factions in Afghanistan, which have been hostile towards Pakistan.

SEC. GATES: Well, again, I think if they’re providing development assistance — you have 44 nations in Afghanistan working right now. You have — shortly will have 100,000 American troops. I think at this stage to worry about India having predominant influence is exaggerated, as far as I’m concerned.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Respectfully, if Pakistan is an ally and the United States is seeking a closer relationship with Pakistan, then shouldn’t such reservations on the part of the Pakistani state be given more importance?

SEC. GATES: We very much pay attention to Pakistan’s reservations, and when I was in India I did not ask them for military trainers and military units.

MS. CHAUDHRY: But did you talk about expanding the contact we’ve been having — (inaudible) — Afghanistan –

SEC. GATES: Our focus was principally on economic development.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Okay. Now, I’m going to quote you again. While in India, you said that it wouldn’t be unreasonable to assume that Indian patience would be limited in case of another attack. And I’m going to ask you why you think that it wouldn’t be unreasonable if such a response from India comes or such retaliation comes in the form of an attack on Pakistani soil.

And the reason I ask you that is because the region is already under attack. Pakistan has daily attacks going on in this country. And you yourself have said that al Qaeda is planning an attack in the region to trigger hostilities between India and Pakistan. So why would you say that it would not be an unreasonable response on the part of the Indians?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, I believe that after the tragic attack on Mumbai that India was restrained in its response. But no country, including the United States, is going to stand idly by if it’s being attacked by somebody.

I think the key thing, though, is to focus on India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States and others working together to make sure that no such attack ever takes place.

MS. CHAUDHRY: But tell me, Mr. Gates, if India is seeking to involve itself more in Afghanistan, be it in a peaceful capacity, doesn’t that open it up more to possibilities of such attacks? Because as we have seen, anybody who has a stake in Afghanistan or anybody who’s playing a larger role in Afghanistan ultimately faces a lashback.

SEC. GATES: Well, the reality is, there are countries and organizations active in Afghanistan that have not been attacked.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Their role was probably minimal then.

SEC. GATES: Well, that depends. I think that — I think, again, the focus just needs to be on all of the countries here in the region, working together to make sure that the opportunity for such attacks doesn’t take place.

MS. CHAUDHRY: All right. So let’s just suppose that such an unfortunate attack does take place in India, and it’s not very clear who the trigger was, whether it was al Qaeda or whether it was some kind of non-state actor. What do you see happening in that eventuality?

SEC. GATES: Well, I don’t want to talk about a hypothetical. I think the key is to make sure that no such attack takes place.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Okay. Do you think Pakistan faces legitimate security concerns on its eastern borders?

SEC. GATES: I think that Pakistan has legitimate security concerns. I think that we are interested in listening to those and working with Pakistan to deal with those. Our primary concern, though, is that issues between states, especially here in this region, be settled peacefully and politically.

MS. CHAUDHRY: So the Indian general has recently issued some statements which were very provocative towards Pakistan. He talked of starting a war simultaneously against Pakistan and China, finishing it off in 96 hours. There was no talk of any trigger or any provocation for that war. So in view of such explicit statements coming out and in the view of the history where we see two recent mobilizations by the Indian army against the Pakistani border, how can Pakistan commit itself for a greater role on its western borders?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think, first of all, because it faces, in its own way, a existential threat on its western border.

MS. CHAUDHRY: But not on its eastern border?

SEC. GATES: I said we understood Pakistan’s legitimate concerns. It also has an existential threat on its western border, and that is the more immediate threat. That is the threat where people have put suicide bombers in Pakistan cities, have killed Pakistani military officers and their families. This is the threat that faces Pakistan most immediately, and that’s the reason why I think, very intelligently, Pakistani leadership has taken action to prevent those kind of attacks from happening.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Now undoubtedly, the Pakistani army is engaged on its western borders because, as you say, Pakistan is facing an existential threat from that side. And it’s acting against the militants, but it’s acting in a certain place which suits itself. Is the United States seeking an escalation on the current pace of operations that are going on?

SEC. GATES: First of all, we admire what the Pakistani army has done. And it has moved, I think importantly, to deal with the threats that it faces in the west. The United States is prepared to help if we can, but it’s clear that the Pakistani army and the Pakistani government, being sovereign, will make their own decision about the pacing and the timing of what they do.

In that context, we are prepared to provide whatever help they want that will make them more effective.

MS. CHAUDHRY: All right. And if the Pakistani army has reservations about escalating its operations on the western side because of recent border skirmishes that are taking place on its eastern border with India in which a Pakistani soldier just got killed, wouldn’t you say that that’s an inopportune time for such activities to be taking place on the Pakistan border with India and that such provocation should be held back in view of the conflict that the whole region is facing?

SEC. GATES: Well, in terms of the deployment of Pakistani soldiers, I leave that to the judgment of the Pakistani leadership.

MS. CHAUDHRY: So what guarantees would be there for Pakistan in case it faces a two-way threat that a lot of analysts are talking about and which undermines its participation in the whole war on terror that it’s essentially facing — (inaudible)?

SEC. GATES: I have seen no evidence that events at this point on the eastern border undermine or threaten Pakistan’s operations on the western border.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Even the current skirmishes that have been taking place on the Pakistani border?

SEC. GATES: I think they pale by comparison with what’s going on in the west.

MS. CHAUDHRY: All right. Now, a bit about the United States. It’s been one year to President Obama’s term. And we would like to ask you what you see his world vision as shaping up for the rest of his presidency.

SEC. GATES: Well, his strategy is clear with respect to Afghanistan. He is prepared to put significant additional U.S. forces in. Our allies, following his lead, are prepared to add even more forces. There is a significant additional civilian component that is coming in in terms of governance and development. And it’s clearly the president’s intent that beginning in July of 2011 that Afghanistan would begin to take responsibility for more of its own country in terms of security. They already are responsible for security in the Kabul area.

MS. CHAUDHRY: But what type of –

SEC. GATES: And so we believe — the president believes that over a period of time, beginning in 2011, that the Afghans will have the capability to do this. But where it takes place and the pace at which it takes place will depend on the conditions on the ground.

MS. CHAUDHRY: And do you see a timeline on how this thing plays up? How soon do you think the Afghans will be able to take control, take reins of their own governance?

SEC. GATES: I think, based on what we’ve already seen, as I say, they already have responsibility for security in the Kabul area, and we’re talking about individual districts, individual provinces. And I think certainly not later than July of 2011, they will begin to be in a position to assume security control in other areas.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Okay. And now speaking of July 2011, every war has a political timeline. And with the surge policy, an exit was already announced, which would start in 2011. If the political restraints on the domestic politics in the United States build up, what kind of a constrain would that put on the timeline which has been followed in Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: I see no reason that the beginning of the process that the president outlined could not take place as he decided and that a responsible drawdown after that time, again based on conditions on the ground, could not take place.

MS. CHAUDHRY: So the domestic agenda in the United States you feel would not affect the international effort on the war in Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: I think that there is broad bipartisan support for the effort, in the United States, for the effort the president is making in Afghanistan.

MS. CHAUDHRY: What about the population of the United States?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that’s the basis of the bipartisan support.

MS. CHAUDHRY: What about the calls that are coming in one year through because there was a seat that was being contested in Massachusetts, and it’s traditionally favoring the — (inaudible) — but apparently the whole race up to that has been very cutthroat, and some people say that’s indicting of current policy.

SEC. GATES: I haven’t watched very carefully, but I don’t think Afghanistan was ever an issue in that race.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Okay. All right. Another question on the Pakistani side is, because there have been a lot of attacks in Pakistan, and the militants are getting their arms and their funding from somewhere. Now obviously, that’s not from the Pakistani — (inaudible) — because the Pakistani government would not be arming militants to attack itself. Where do you think this funding is coming from? And where do you think this chain of arms supplies is being tied to?

SEC. GATES: Well, this goes back to my earlier comments with respect to both al Qaeda and the Taliban on both sides of the border. We think that the Taliban gets some of their money from illegal narcotics. We think they get some of their money from stealing and from kidnappings. And they also get some money from the Middle East.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Who do you think is supplying the Pakistani Taliban with such a huge cache of arms?

(Cross talk.)

SEC. GATES: Well, my impression from 25 years ago is that there’s no shortage of arms in the border area.

MS. CHAUDHRY: And you think that it is relatively new, or you would say it’s still –

SEC. GATES: Again, it may be taken from dead soldiers. I don’t know.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Okay. All right. Now, you’ve also talked about you’ve supported the Afghan reconciliation project that the Karzai government is starting, which would be supporting lower-level Taliban inductees to come back to a regular mainstream life where they would be supporting them on education and income. I’d like to ask you, how permanent do you think the results of this reconciliation project would be unless the underlying grievances, which caused these people to become inductees in the first place, are not resolved?

SEC. GATES: There is no question that without political reconciliation, without different tribes and ethnic groups being given their fair share of representation and power in the country, and without economic development, that a peaceful and stable Afghanistan will be difficult to achieve. Those are clearly the goals that everyone associated with this effort have in common.

MS. CHAUDHRY: What do you see is the underlying cause of so many grievances? What do you see is the primary cause why the Taliban had such success in recruiting from the Afghan population?

SEC. GATES: Well, for one thing, this is a country that’s been at war for 30 years. And I think that you had conflicts between the warlords. You had a population that fundamentally has been at war and has had no economic development and so on for a long time. And so I think that it’s not surprising that, in their desperation, some people would turn to the Taliban. I think that there are concerns about corruption, there are concerns about, in the past, a lack of democracy. I think those issues are being addressed, as is economic development.

And as I said, we think a fair number of the Taliban fighters fight simply for a paycheck or because they’re intimidated into doing so for fear that their families will be killed.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Now, Mr. Gates, again, I would like to ask you, once the Soviets left Afghanistan, there was a decade-long warfare which ensued between different tribes and ethnicities, and that really didn’t have much to do with the fact that, you know, they were being funded by certain organizations or not. It was because a political balance in Afghanistan was not achieved.

In view of the exit announcement which has been given for July 2011, do you see such a political balance forming by then?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that we certainly are seeing progress toward that. We’ve now had two successful presidential elections in Afghanistan. There will be parliamentary elections. I think people are beginning to see a political process work.

But by the same token, the international community is not going to leave Afghanistan in July 2011. There will still be many soldiers there. There will still be many civilian workers trying to help the Afghans develop their economy, develop governance and deal with the problems that they have.

I think one of the lessons that was learned after the Soviets left Afghanistan, on the part of the international community, was that it was a mistake to neglect Afghanistan. I don’t think that will happen again.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Speaking of neglect, one of the festering issues in South Asia is Kashmir. And a lot of analysts feel that if Kashmir was resolved or if some move was made to resolve Kashmir in a very serious manner, that would help take down tensions in this region a lot.

Why is there no international mediation on that front? And why is no concerted movement made to placate at least one big source of discontent in this region?

SEC. GATES: My impression is, going back quite some time, that both of the parties involved would rather deal with the issue on their own and not have outside interventions.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Okay. Would you say the Pakistani government does not want intervention on the Kashmiri cause?

SEC. GATES: I think both sides would like to handle the issue bilaterally.

MS. CHAUDHRY: All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Gates. It was great talking to you. And yet tons more questions, but we are short of time.

Thank you for watching, viewers. Mr. Gates in his article today mentioned that Pakistan and the United States are not merely allies and partners, but they are friends. So this was an effort to garner further clarity and understanding between two nations which are friends at the end of the day.

With that, we hope some of the questions that were on your mind were answered today. We bid you goodbye, enjoy your evening and have a great weekend.